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United States v. Dickerson: The Beginning of
the End for Miranda?

In United States v. Dickerson,' the Fourth Circuit held that the
admissibility of a confession in federal courts is determined by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501,2 not the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Arizona.3 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit concluded, pursuant to the
statute, that admissibility
of a confession depends upon whether or not
4
it is voluntary.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 27, 1997, several FBI agents traveled to defendant
Charles Dickerson's apartment to investigate a bank robbery. After a
brief conversation, Dickerson agreed to accompany the agents to the FBI
office in Washington, D.C. Initially, Dickerson denied any involvement
but admitted to being in the vicinity of the bank at the time of the
robbery.5 Based upon this and other information,6 the agents obtained
a warrant to search Dickerson's apartment.'
Upon returning to the interview room, one of the interviewing agents
informed Dickerson that his apartment would soon be searched.
Dickerson subsequently indicated that he wished to make a statement.
He admitted to driving the getaway car in several bank robberies,

1. 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
3. 166 F.3d at 695. The court also concluded that the executed warrant was sufficiently
particular in its description of the items to be seized and that the officers acted in good
faith in executing the warrant. Id. Thus, the court reversed the district court's order
suppressing defendant's statements at the FBI Field Office and the physical evidence
retrieved after a search of his apartment before remanding the case for further proceedings.

Id.
4. Id. at 692.
5. Id. at 673.
6. Id. The agents had information that the culprits had left the scene in a car
registered to defendant. Additionally, the agents had discovered that Dickerson had over
$550 in cash when they picked him up and had paid his landlord a large sum to cover back
rent the same day. Id.
7. Id. at 673-74.
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identifying Jimmy Rochester as the actual robber. Moreover, Dickerson
indicated that on the date in question, he stopped the car near the bank
whereupon Rochester exited the vehicle. 8 After describing suspicious
actions on the part of Rochester,9 Dickerson was placed under arrest. °
Dickerson's confession resulted in the arrest of Rochester. Rochester
stated that Dickerson was his driver in seven bank robberies in both
Maryland and Virginia." The search of Dickerson's apartment and
automobile yielded a large amount of incriminating evidence.' 2 This
accumulation of evidence resulted in Dickerson's indictment by a federal
grand jury on several charges related to the bank robberies. 3
On May 19, 1997, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress the statements
he made during the FBI interview. 4 A hearing was held in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on May 30,
1997.15 The parties disputed whether defendant had been read his
Miranda rights and whether he waived them prior to his confession. On
July 1, 1997, the district court suppressed Dickerson's statement, which
implicated himself and Rochester in the bank robbery. The district court
concluded that the statement was made while Dickerson was in police
custody, in response16 to police interrogation, and without the necessary
Miranda warnings.

8. Id. at 674.
9. Id. Dickerson indicated that upon returning to the car, Rochester placed something
in the trunk. Additionally, Dickerson acknowledged that Rochester had given him a
handgun and some dye-stained money. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The search of defendant's apartment yielded a forty-five caliber handgun, dyestained money, a bait bill, ammunition, masks, and latex gloves. A warrant-authorized
search of his vehicle yielded a leather bag and solvent used to clean dye-stained money.
Id.
13. Id. The indictment included one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (1994 & West Supp. 1998), three counts of bank robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(a) and (d) (1994 & West Supp. 1998), and three counts of
using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(c)(1) (1994 & West Supp. 1998).
14. 166 F.3d at 674. The motion to suppress also included three other things: (1) the
evidence found as a result of his statements; (2) the physical evidence obtained during the
search of his apartment; and (3) the physical evidence obtained during the search of his
car. Id.
15. Id. at 674-75.
16. Id. at 675. The district court's holding rested on its finding that Dickerson's
testimony was more believable than the special agent's. The court found that the agent's
testimony that he read Dickerson his Miranda warnings "shortly after" obtaining the
warrant was contradicted by the time the warrant was issued and the time of the execution
of the advice-of-rights form. Accordingly, the district court found Dickerson's testimony
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However, the district court found that Dickerson's statement was
voluntary under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 7 On
July 15, 1997, the Government filed a motion for reconsideration of the
district court's order suppressing Dickerson's statements made at the
FBI interview.18 The Government contended that because Dickerson's
statements were voluntary, they were admissible pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501.'9
The Government's motion for reconsideration was denied on August
4, 1997.20 Pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,21 the district court denied the Government's motion for reconsideration because the Government failed to establish that the evidence was
not available when the hearing was ongoing. 22 The Government filed
23
an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

Although the Government contended in its motion for reconsideration
that Dickerson's statement was admissible pursuant to Section 3501, it
did not raise the applicability of the statute on appeal.24 In fact the
Justice Department would not permit the United States Attorney's Office
to brief the issue.2" Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit decided to use its

that he was read his Miranda rights approximately thirty minutes after being told of the
warrant to be credible. Id. at 675-76.
17. Id. at 676. Because the statement was determined to be voluntary under the Fifth
Amendment, evidence found as a result thereof was admissible. Id. Thus, Dickerson's
motion to suppress that evidence, the statement made by Rochester that Dickerson was the
getaway driver, was denied. Id. However, because the court found that the warrant was
insufficiently particular and there was no basis for the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, the physical evidence discovered during the search of the apartment was
suppressed. Id. Finally, because the warrant was deemed to be sufficiently particular,
Dickerson's motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the trunk of his car was denied.
Id.
18. Id. The motion for reconsideration also included the district court's order
suppressing the physical evidence found from the search of Dickerson's apartment. Id.
19. Id. The motion also included an affidavit from one of the investigating detectives
that "Dickerson was read his Miranda rights before he made th[e] statements." Id.
Attached to this affidavit was a hand-written statement by Dickerson indicating that he
was read his Miranda warnings before implicating himself and his accomplice in the
robbery. Finally, the motion included an affidavit from another agent contradicting the
finding that the agents acted in bad faith. Id. at 676.77.
20. United States v. Dickerson, 971 F. Supp 1023, 1024 (E.D, Va. 1997).
21. FED. R. CIrv. P. 59(e). The court noted that no provision in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure governed motions for reconsideration. 971 F. Supp. at 1024.
22. Id.
23. 166 F.3d at 677.
24. Id. at 681.
25. Id. at 682.
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own discretion to determine whether Section 3501 governs the admissi-

26
bility of confessions in federal courts.

II.

LEGAL HISTORY

At common law, confessions that were voluntarily made were
admissible against an individual at trial. In 1884 the Supreme Court
essentially adopted this rule, concluding that a confession which was
made voluntarily was admissible, basing its decision on the reliability of
such a confession.2 8 The Court subsequently declined to announce a
per se rule that any confession made while in custody was involuntary.29 Moreover, in 1896 the Court concluded that neglecting to warn
an individual of his right to remain silent and of his right to an attorney
were alone insufficient for a finding of an involuntary confession. 0
In Bram v. United States,"1 the Court announced a constitutional
basis for its rule that a confession must be made voluntarily, stating
that the issue of voluntariness "is controlled by that portion of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States commanding that
no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.' ' 3 2 The Court indicated that this part of the Fifth
Amendment essentially codified the common law rule requiring that
confessions be voluntary to be admissible.33 Years later, the Court
would question whether this rule derived from the Fifth Amendment's
protection against self-incrimination or from concerns about whether
35
forced confessions are untrustworthy. 4 In Brown v.Mississippi,
the
rule was extended to the states when the Court concluded that to be
admissible, a confession had to be voluntary within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3"
Prior to 1966 the rule determining the admissibility of confessions in
federal courts was consistent for many years, even if its origin was
somewhat unclear. Specifically, the traditional rule was that a

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 683.
EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 146 (3d ed. 1984).
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1884).
See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895).
Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896).
168 U.S. 532 (1897).
Id. at 542 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
Id. at 543.
See, e.g., United States v. Carnigan, 342 U.S. 36, 41 (1951) (footnote omitted).
297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Id. at 285-87 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
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voluntary confession was admissible at trial.
In 1941 the Court
specifically indicated that "voluntariness" was the test for assessing the
admissibility of confessions in federal courts.3" Whatever the rule's
traditional basis, the Court would articulate a different approach for
determining the admissibility of confessions.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 9 the Court rejected the individualized
inquiry of whether a confession was voluntary, holding that any
statement resulting from the custodial interrogation of an individual
would be presumed involuntary and inadmissible unless the suspect was
first provided with four warnings by the police. 4 Despite its decision
in Brain, in which the Court held that the Fifth Amendment required
voluntariness, 4 ' the Court in Miranda conceded that the Constitution
did not require any specific remedy to combat the inherent compulsions
which plagued the interrogation process.42 The Court left the door open
for the states and Congress to "develop their own safeguards for the
privilege, so long as they are fully as effective as [the four warnings] in
informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a
continuous opportunity to exercise it."43 However, until such a time,

the Court stated that the safeguards must be adhered to."
Two years after the Court's decision in Miranda, Congress enacted
Section 3501."5 The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by
the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e)
hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before
such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the
presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the
trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall
be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to
hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct
37. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that before Miranda, "voluntariness vel non was the touchstone of admissibility
of confessions"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 506-07 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(stating that voluntariness has traditionally been the test for admitting confessions).
38. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
39. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
40. Id. at 467-74. The four warnings are (1) that the suspect has the right to remain
silent; (2) that any statement he makes can and will be used against him; (3) that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning; and (4) that an attorney will
be appointed for him if he cannot afford one. Id. at 444.
41. Brain, 168 U.S. at 544.
42. 384 U.S. at 467.
43. Id. at 490.
44. Id. at 467.
45. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 685.

1364

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it
deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall
take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of
the confession, including
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the
defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before
arraignment,
(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of
making the confession,
(3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was
not required to make any statement and that any such statement could
be used against him,
(4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to
questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and
(5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of
counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be
taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the
issue of voluntariness of the confession ....
(e) As used in this section, the term "confession" means any
confession of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating
statement made or given orally or in writing."
The Fourth Circuit emphasized that Congress's intention to return to an
individualized inquiry of whether a confession is voluntary was
manifested not only in the plain language of the statute but also in its
legislative history.4 7
Despite the express intent of Congress in enacting Section 3501, the
United States Department of Justice has never vigorously enforced this
provision. 48 Nonetheless, Paul Cassell, a law professor and former

46. 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
47. 166 F.3d at 686. The court referred to S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in
1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112. The Senate Report accompanying Section 3501 specifically
indicated that "[tiheintent of the bill is to reverse the holding of Miranda v. Arizona. ...."
Id. at 2141. Additionally, the reports noted that Miranda "is the case to which the bill is
directly addressed." Id. Senate opponents also realized that the legislation was a response
to Miranda's irrebuttable presumption by returning to a voluntariness inquiry. Id. at
2210-11. Moreover, both supporters and opponents of the legislation in the House of
Representatives indicated that the statute was designed to overrule the irrebuttable
presumption created by Miranda. See, e.g., 114 Cong. Rec. 16.066 (1968) (statement of
Rep. Celler); Id. at 16.074 (statement of Rep. Corman); Id. at 16.278 (statement of Rep.
Taylor); Id. at 16.296 (statement of Rep. Randall); Id. at 16.297-98 (statement of Rep.
Pollock).
48. 166 F.3d at 671.
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Associate Deputy Attorney General who has submitted amicus briefs in
support of Section 3501, contends that the Clinton Administration is the
only Executive Department in the thirty year history of the statute that
has ever indicated that the statute is unconstitutional or prevented its
use.4" Cassell asserts that even though the constitutionality of Section
3501 was rarely addressed by the courts, the Justice Department, from
the Nixon Administration through the Bush Administration, had no
policy against its use. °
The Supreme Court has referred to Section 3501 as "the statute
governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions.""
However, the Court has never addressed whether the statute overruled
Miranda.52 Several lower courts have concluded that Section 3501, not
53
Miranda, determines the admissibility of confessions in federal court.
However, since its passage, administrations have generally avoided
Recently, Attorney General Janet Reno
enforcing the statute.54
asserted that the Justice Department has had a long-standing policy
that dates to previous administrations against enforcing the statute
because of doubts as to whether it was constitutional. 5 Nonetheless,
members of the current Justice Department-including the Attorney
General-have previously indicated that there is no policy against
utilizing the statute "in an appropriate case.""
Prior to the Department of Justice's questioning the constitutionality
of Section 3501, Justice Scalia expressed his displeasure with the Justice
Department's consistent failure to enforce the provision.57 According
to Scalia, the department's refusal to invoke the statute has resulted in

49. Paul G. Cassell, Statement of Paul G. Cassell Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice Oversight of the Senate JudiciaryComm. (May 13, 1999), available at <http:\\www.law.utah.edu\faculty\bios\cassell\Miranda\casselltestimony.html>.
50. Id.
51. United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 351 (1994).
52. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n.* (1994).
53. See United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129, 1137 (10th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424, 1430-36 (D. Utah 1997).
54. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 463-64 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that every
Administration in the twenty-five years since the enactment of Section 3501 has failed to
enforce the provision).
55. Cassell, supra note 49 (citing Press Conference of Attorney General Janet Reno
(February 11, 1999)), availableat <http:\\www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/1999/febll99.htm>.
56. Id. (citing Solicitor General Oversight: HearingBefore The Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1995); The Administrationof Justice and Enforcement
of Laws: HearingsBefore The Senate JudiciaryComm., 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (June 27,

1995) (written answer of Attorney General Reno to question of Senator Hatch)).
57. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the needless presentation of Mirandaissues and the release of numerous
dangerous criminals.5"
In United States v. Sullivan,"s the Fourth Circuit was asked by amici
to determine the admissibility of a confession under the statute.6 °
However, because the court concluded that custody had not yet attached,
it declined to address the applicability of Section 3501.61 The Fourth
Circuit would get its chance to visit that issue the following year in
Dickerson.
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S RATIONALE
In Dickerson the Fourth Circuit noted that whether Section 3501
determines the admissibility of defendant's confession depends upon
whether it supersedes the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda, and if
so, whether Congress has the power to legislatively overrule that
decision. 62 The court, after examining the specific language and
legislative history 'of the statute, concluded that Congress clearly
intended to return to the pre-Mirandainquiry of whether a confession
was voluntary.63
The court then addressed whether Congress had the power to
supersede the judicially created irrebuttable presumption in Miranda
that any statement made without the warnings is involuntary, and
therefore, inadmissible.6 4 The court began this inquiry by noting the
Supreme Court's recent decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.65 The
Court in Flores concluded that Congress lacked the authority to
supersede a Supreme Court decision interpreting the Constitution.6 6
However, the court in Dickerson noted that Congress does have the
power to supplant judicially created rules of evidence and procedure that
Therefore, regarding
the Constitution does not mandate.67
nonconstitutional "rules of procedure and evidence for the federal

58. Id.
59. 138 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1998).
60. Id. at 134.

61.

Id.

62.
63.
64.
65.

166 F.3d at 680.
Id. at 685-87.
Id. at 687.
Id.; Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

66. 166 F.3d at 687 (citing Flores, 521 U.S. at 536).
67. Id. (citing Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345-48 (1959); Carlisle v. United
States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265 (1980)).
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courts," the Court's role is limited to instances in which Congress has

not acted.68
The Fourth Circuit, using this framework, indicated that some federal
courts have determined that Section 3501 superseded the rule announced in McNabb v.United States69 and Mallory v. United States.v°
Pursuant to its supervisory power over federal courts, the Court in
McNabb concluded that any incriminating statements, including
voluntary confessions, which were made during an unreasonable delay
between defendant's arrest and first appearance, were inadmissible."'
The Fourth Circuit stated that because these decisions were not
constitutionally required, it was easy for the Eighth and Sixth Circuits
72
to determine that Congress had the power to overrule both cases.
The court then returned to an analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion
in Miranda.73 Although the Court in Miranda did not specifically
provide a basis for its holding, it hinted that the basis was no different
than that set forth in McNabb and Mallory.74 Moreover, the Court in
Mirandaconceded that the warnings were not required by the Constitution.7 5 Significantly, the Court continuously referred to the warnings
as "procedural safeguards,"76 inviting Congress and the states "to
develop their own safeguards for [protecting] the privilege."77
The court in Dickerson then focused on how the Supreme Court has
described and interpreted Miranda since the decision was announced. 8
The Supreme 7 Court has often indicated that the warnings are only
"prophylactic," " and the safeguards are "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution."8 0 Specifically, the Court has held that

68. Id. (citing Palermo, 360 U.S. at 353 n.ll; Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414,
418 (1953)).
69. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
70. 166 F.3d at 688 (citing United States v. Pugh, 25 F.3d 669, 675 (8th Cir. 1994);

United States v. Christopher, 956 F.2d 536, 538-39 (6th Cir. 1991)); Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
71. 318 U.S. at 343-44. This decision was upheld in Mallory. 354 U.S. at 455-56.
72. 166 F.3d at 688 (citing Pugh, 25 F.3d at 675; Christopher, 956 F.2d at 538-39).
73. Id.
74. 384 U.S. at 463.
75. Id. at 467.
76. Id. at 444.
77. Id. at 490.
78. 166 F.3d at 689.
79. Id. (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)).
80. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)). See also Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1994); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-91
(1993); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523,
528 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
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statements made in technical violation of Miranda were admissible for
the purpose of impeachment, provided that the statements were
voluntary."' Moreover, the Court has refused to extend the "tainted
fruits" doctrine to a situation in which the defendant's questioning was
not accompanied by the warnings, noting that the police did not violate
any constitutional rights "'but departed only from the prophylactic
standards later laid down by this court in Miranda to safeguard that
privilege.'8 2 Additionally, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court's sole justification for creating an emergency exception to Miranda
was that such a violation was not necessarily constitutionally based. 3
Finally, when a confession that was accompanied by the necessary
warnings resulted only after a Miranda violation, the Court once again
there was no
refused to extend the "tainted fruits" doctrine because
4
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.8
The court in Dickerson noted that the Supreme Court's decisions
indicate that it is "well established that the failure to deliver Miranda
warnings is not itself a constitutional violation."8 5 Thus, the Constitution does not require Miranda'sjudicially created irrebuttable presumption that a confession not accompanied by the warnings is presumed
involuntary.8 Only Congress, pursuant to its power to prescribe the
evidentiary and procedural rules in federal courts, has the authority to
supplant the Miranda presumption. 7 The Fourth Circuit did not
address how Miranda could be applied to the states if it is not constitutionally based, dismissing it as "an interesting academic question."'
The court emphasized that while Congress was merely responding to
the Supreme Court's invitation to enact its own safeguards, 9 the sole

492 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
81. Id. (citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1971); cf. Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 401-02 (1978) (holding that involuntary statements could not even be
admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment)).
82. Id. (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445-46 & n.19).
83. Id. at 689-90 (citing Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654).
84. Id. at 690 (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1989)).
85. Id. (citing United States v. Elie, 111 F.3d 1135, 1142 (4th Cir. 1997)); see also
Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279, 1290 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that "a technical violation
of Miranda [is not necessarily] a Fifth Amendment violation").
86. 166 F.3d at 690.
87. Id. at 691 (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996); Vance v.
Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265 (1980); Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 345-48 (1959);
cf. Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, was it Overruled, or is it Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS
L. REV. 461, 461-65, 479 (1998) (concluding that Section 3501 "overruled Miranda" but
arguing that Miranda was already dead)).
88. Id. at 691 n.21.
89. Id. at 691 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460).
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source of the Court's power was the lack of a federal statute governing
the issue. 9° Thus, when Congress passed Section 3501, the Court's
authority to proscribe the procedural safeguards ceased."'
The court concluded by asserting that Section 3501 would not
necessarily lessen the protections derived from the Fifth Amendment but
would instead prevent the release of criminals on mere technicalities. 2
Because the warnings are still factors evaluated by the district court
when assessing whether a confession is voluntary, the court emphasized
that its decision would not provide police officers with an incentive to
refrain from reading the warnings.9 3 Instead, the court stated that
reading the warnings would remain the best way to assure a finding of
voluntariness."
Accordingly, the court held that the admissibility of confessions in
federal courts is determined by 18 U.S.C. § 3501, not Miranda.5
Therefore, the court reversed the district court's order suppressing the
statements made by Dickerson during the FBI interview, remanding the
case for further proceedings.9 "
One circuit judge dissented in part, contending first that the majority
should not have substituted its judgment for that of the Department of
Justice.97 Additionally, the dissent asserted that because the issue of
Section 3501 was not briefed by the Government, it was not properly
before the court.9" The dissent further argued that courts should defer
to an executive's discretion regarding criminal prosecutions.99 Moreover, the dissent stated that it was not prudent to decide issues not
raised by the parties." ° Additionally, the dissent asked, "[ilf Miranda
is not a constitutional rule, why does the Supreme Court continue to
apply it in prosecutions arising in state courts?"1"'
Finally, the

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 691-92.
93. Id. at 692 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501(b)).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 695. The court also concluded that the warrant was sufficiently particular
and that the officers, in executing the warrant, acted in good faith. Id.
96. Id. The court also reversed the district court's order suppressing the physical
evidence which was discovered pursuant to the search of his apartment. Id.
97. Id. (Michael, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice Michael
concurred with the majority that the warrant should be upheld pursuant to the good faith
exception but dissented from the holding that the warrant was sufficiently specific. Id.
98. Id. Only the amici, the Washington Legal Foundation and the Safe Streets
Coalition, contended that Section 3501 governed this issue.
99. Id. at 696 (citations omitted).
100. Id. at 697.
101. Id.
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dissenting judge maintained that Congress, not the judiciary, should
inquire as to why 10administrations
have refused to enforce Section 3501
2
for three decades.

IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Currently, the impact of the Fourth Circuit's decision is limited to
determining the admissibility of confessions in federal courts in Virginia,
West Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina.'03
However, the Supreme Court recently decided to hear the Dickerson
case." 4 Whatever the Court ultimately decides, the Fourth Circuit's
decision will definitely have major implications. It will enable the Court
to decide the fate of the Miranda warnings, something the Court has
been unwilling to do in the past.' 5
If the Supreme Court proceeds to reverse Miranda, the magnitude of
the Fourth Circuit's decision will impact all federal courts. If the Court
affirms the Fourth Circuit's decision that failure to give the warnings
does not automatically preclude the use of evidence in federal cases,
states would presumably be permitted to enact statutes similar to
Section 3501.10 Of course, if the Court determines that the statute is
constitutional, the rules governing confessions in federal prosecutions
would immediately be significantly altered. According to Bureau of
Justice statistics, federal prosecutions make up only about five percent
of total criminal prosecutions. 1 7 However, if states follow suit by
passing laws consistent with Section 3501, then the magnitude of the
Fourth Circuit's decision will indeed be realized.'l8
The Supreme Court's decision will likely be a close one which could be
decided by the slimmest of margins.' °9 Prior writings indicate that
Chief Justice Rehnquist along with Justices Scalia and Thomas are the
most likely to vote to overrule Miranda.n3° Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer would appear to be less willing to depart from the
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longstanding precedent.11
The key votes will likely be those of
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy."2
Although generally tough on
criminal law matters, both have previously authored opinions endorsing
Miranda and may be reluctant to significantly alter the way that our
criminal justice system operates. 3
If the Supreme Court upholds Section 3501, some maintain that police
practices will not significantly change in that officers will likely continue
to read suspects their rights. Some have noted that the Fourth Circuit's
opinion specifically indicated that it should not be interpreted as a
disincentive to give the warnings." 4 Glenn Lammi, an attorney for the
Washington Legal Foundation, believes that police behavior will not
change because the statute specifically refers to most of the warnings
as factors that a court must consider in making its inquiry regarding
voluntariness." 5 However, the statute makes no mention of the right
to have an appointed counsel if the accused cannot afford an attorney."' Nonetheless, opponents of Miranda contend that the statutory
safeguards are adequate." 7 Moreover, one commentator contends that
because Miranda has become such a part of American life, the Court
could not completely undo the 1966 decision even if it tried." s Thus,
the question then becomes whether reliable evidence such as a voluntary
confession should be suppressed merely because of a technicality. 9
Some had thought that there were additional obstacles which could
prevent proponents of Section 3501 from realizing their goal. It was
amici, the Washington Legal Foundation and the Safe Streets Coalition,
not the Government, who injected Section 3501 into the case. 20 As a
result, the dissenting judge in Dickerson contended that the validity of
the statute was not properly before the court.' 2 1 Similarly, some
experts once thought that the Supreme Court would refuse to address
the constitutionality of the statute because of the unusual procedural
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history.12 2 However, the Court has asked University of Utah law
professor Paul G. Cassell, who has previously submitted briefs on behalf
of the Washington Legal Foundation, to argue that Section 3501 should
govern the admissibility of confessions in federal courts. 2 3 Thus, the
Court will apparently decide the validity of the statute despite the
Government's failure to rely on it at the district or appellate court level.
Until recently, it was unclear as to what position the Department of
Justice would take on the statute if it came before the Supreme Court.
The Justice Department finally concluded that the petition for certiorari
should be granted regarding the admissibility of defendant's statements. 124 However, the Government contends that the fact that
Mirandahas consistently been applied to the states indicates that it has
a constitutional foundation and cannot be superseded merely by
legislation such as Section 3501.125 Finally, the Justice Department
urged the Court not to overrule Miranda because of the principle of stare
the unique role that the case plays in our criminal justice
decisis and
6
system. 12

Certainly, the basis for the Miranda decision will have to be addressed. The dissenting judge questioned the majority's finding that the
Court's decision was not constitutionally based. 127 The dissent responded by rhetorically asking why the Court repeatedly applied the
judicial rule to state prosecutions. 128 Some amici who have argued in
favor of the statute have indicated that Miranda's application to the
states does not mean that it is constitutionally required. 129 Rather,
the amici contend that it may be a constitutional common law decision.' 3 1 Alternatively, because of the number of issues addressed in
of
Miranda, the Court may not have specifically considered the issue 131
whether federal courts have supervisory power over the states.
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Finally, proponents of Section 3501 have noted that Miranda has been
consistently referred to as "prophylactic."132
One commentator has explained that fashioning presumptions and
prophylactic rules is a necessary part of the judiciary. 33 Specifically,
Yale Kamisar notes that because prudential concerns prevent the Court
from hearing all but a limited number of cases, it must establish such
rules in order to give meaning to constitutional rights.' 3' Accordingly,
since Miranda the Court has created what it has referred to as
prophylactic rules 5and subsequently cited the establishment of such
rules approvingly.1

According to Justice Scalia, however, by continuously refusing to
address the constitutionality of the statute, courts are neglecting their
responsibility to decide what the law is. 36 Nonetheless, as Kamisar
notes, the Court has indicated that the Miranda opinion struck "the
proper balance"37between police interests and the constitutional rights of
the defendant.

Undoubtedly, one of the advantages of the Miranda decision is the
bright line test that the Court announced. If the statute is upheld,
courts will be forced to conduct "voluntariness" inquiries that will likely
result in prudential problems. 3 This will no doubt have a major
impact on federal prosecutions and in any prosecutions in states that
enact similar statutes.
How the Court will rule is difficult to predict. What is certain is that
the Fourth Circuit's decision will have major ramifications, perhaps
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providing the impetus that alters a significant part of our criminal
justice system. Because of the make-up of the Court, it may be unlikely
that Miranda will be completely discarded. Perhaps the Court will
fashion some sort of compromise and avoid directly the question of
Miranda's continued vitality. For example, the Court may transform
Miranda's irrebuttable presumption that any custodial statement not
accompanied by the warnings is involuntary into a rebuttable presumption. Alternatively, the Court may place a premium on videotaping
interrogations to eliminate coercion by holding that the failure to
videotape should be a strong factor in suggesting that a confession is
involuntary.139 Additionally, the Court might alter the warnings in a
manner which provides the suspect with more incentive to cooperate. 140 For example, the warnings could provide that silence at the
time of interrogation could be used against a party upon later offering
Such 1a42 compromise would give a little to both conservaan alibi.
tives and liberals.
Obviously, the Court's decision will immediately impact federal
prosecutions. It will also likely have a major effect on how state
prosecutions are conducted if the Court finds that the Mirandawarnings
are not constitutionally required. This may result in states enacting
legislation similar to Section 3501 if legislatures are given more
responsibility for establishing requirements for police interrogations.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's decision will indeed have major implications.
JAMES R. O'NEILL
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